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RECENT CASES
Bankruptcy-Preference-Assignment of Accounts Receivable
Set Aside Under Section 60 in Jurisdiction Where Notice to Debtor
is Required-With the consent of the majority of the creditors, X
assigned its accounts receivable to P bank as security for present loans. No
notice of the assignments was given the debtors. More than four months
after the original execution of the transaction, X was adjudicated a bank-
rupt and the bank filed proof of claim as a secured creditor. Held,' (Mr.
Justice Roberts dissenting), since the assignments were never perfected as
against a bona fide purchaser under Pennsylvania law,2 they are deemed to
have been made immediately prior to bankruptcy under Section 6o (a) 3
of the Bankruptcy Act, and can be avoided as preferences by the trustee
because made for an antecedent debt.4 Corn Exchange National Bank v.
Klauder, i i U. S. L. WEEK 4242(943).
From the inception of bankruptcy legislation it has been, in general,
impossible to have a preference unless there results a diminution of the
bankrupt's estate by reason of the transfer.5 Prior to the instant case, the.
Supreme Court, relying on the language of Section 6o (a) as it existed
before the Chandler Act, 6 consistently held that the time for determining
the effect of a transfer on the debtor's estate is the date of the original exe-
cution df the transaction.7 The new Section 6o (a) provides that the trans-
fer shall be deemed to have been made when it becomes so far perfected that
no bona fide purchaser could thereafter have acquired any rights in the
property, and that if not so perfected it shall be deemed to have been made
immediately before bankruptcy." Therefore, in jurisdictions where the first
i. Affirming the decision of the Circuit Court, In re Quaker City Sheet Metal
Company, 129 F. (2d) 894 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942).
2. Under the applicable Pennsylvania law a bona fide subsequent assignee who
first gives notice will acquire rights superior to a prior assignee who has failed to give
notice. Phillips's Estate (No. 3), 205 Pa. 5,5, 523, 55 At. 213, 215 (29o3) ; cf. Phil-
lips's Estate (No. 4), 205 Pa. 525, 55 AtI. 26 (1903). Pennsylvania no longer has
this rule, although the instant case was decided under Pennsylvania law while this rule
was still in effect. A record of assignment on the books of the assignor is now suf-
ficient to perfect the transfer. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 69, § 56i.
3. ". . . for the purposes of subdivisions a and b of this section, a transfer shall
be deemed to have been made at the time when it became so far perfected that no bona-
fide purchaser from the debtor and no creditor could thereafter have acquired any
rights in the property so transferred superior to the rights of the transferee therein,
and, if such transfer is not so far perfected prior to the filing of the petition in bank-
ruptcy . . ., it shall be deemed to have been made immediately before bankruptcy."
BANKRUPTCY ACT, § 60 (a), 52 STAT. 869 (2938), 11 U. S. C.A. § 96 (a) (Supp. 1942).
4. Provided the other elements of a preference, as defined in § 60 (a), are present
and the transferee at the time of transfer has reasonable cause to believe that the debtor
is insolvent. BANKRUPTCY ACT, § 60 (b), 52 STAT. 870 (1938), 11 U. S. C. A. § 96 (b)
(Supp. 1942).
5. 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY (i4th ed. 194) § 6o.a9, and cases there cited.
6. BANKRUPTCY ACT, §§ 6o (a) and (b), as amended in 32 STAT. 799 (193o), ii
U. S. C. A. §96 (1927) and 44 STAT. 666 (x926), iI U. S. C. A. §96 (Supp. 1942).
When the Martin, Carey, and Bailey cases, note 7 infra, were decided § 60 dealt only
with those cases where recording was "required" by state law. Under the 1926 Amend-
ment, the Section dealt with situations where recording was "required" or "permitted"
by applicable local law. A subsequent decision, however, held that this addition in the
1926 Amendment did not change the result in these cases. First National Bank of
Lincoln v. Live Stock National Bank, 31 F. (2d) 416 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
7. Martin v. Commercial National Bank of Macon, Ga., 245 U. S. 513 (1918)
(chattel mortgage); Carey v. Donohue, 24o U. S. 43o (ig96) (real property mort-
gage) ; Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 239 U. S. 268 (1915) (conditional sale).
8. Note 3 .rupra.
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assignee to give the debtor notice of the assignment acquires rights supe-
rior to those of other assignees, if no notice is given by the assignee of a
bankrupt, the transfer is deemed to have been made immediately prior to
bankruptcy because never perfected as against a bona fide transferee. 10
Under the instant decision the time of perfecting the transaction defines the
time when the transfer is made,1' which time is essential in determining
whether the transfer was made to secure or satisfy an antecedent debt and
whether or not it was made within four months prior to bankruptcy. The
interpretation placed on Section 6o (a) by the majority accords with the
expressed intentions of the draftsmen of the Chandler Act,1 2 favoring a
policy of protecting the bankrupt's general creditors from the effect of
secret 18 transactions even at the expense of frustrating the commercial prac-
tice of "non-notification financing" 14 sanctioned in a lower court decision,15
forming the basis of Mr. Justice Roberts' dissent. The dissent in sanc-
tioning the commercial practice seems to ignore the real issue in the case; "I
the majority squarely faces the legal problem presented, the Congressional
intent expressed in Section 6o (a) as amended by the Chandler Act, and
resolves it in accordance with the intent of the draftsmen 1T and the gen-
eral policy of the Bankruptcy Act.'8
Conflict of Laws-Burden of Proof as "Substance" or "Pro-
cedure" Under the Jones Act-Plaintiff, a seaman, brought action in
the Pennsylvania court under the Jones Act 1 for negligent injuries. Judg-
9. This seems to be the majority view. See Note (1924) 3 A. L. R. 876. In Salem
Trust Co. v. Manufacturers Finance Co., 264 U. S. 182 (1924), (1924) 72 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 446, the Supreme Court sanctioned the view that a subsequent assignee takes
nothing by his assignment since the assignor transferred all his rights in the first
assignment and had nothing left to transfer by the subsequent assignment. In juris-
dictions adopting this view, the problem of the instant case will not arise since the
assignment will be perfected at the time of the original transaction.
80. §6o (a), note 3 supra.
ii. The instant decision does not have the effect of transforming a present consid-
eration into a past consideration. Under this rule courts will determine, for the pur-
pose of bankruptcy, when the transaction was perfected under local law and date the
transfer from that time. Thus if the debt was contracted before the transaction was"perfected" against a bona fide purchaser and transferor goes bankrupt before such
"perfection", the transaction is, by the express provisions of Section 6o (a) deemed
made immediately before bankruptcy and hence the debt is pre-existing.
82. HANNA AND McLAUGHLIN, THE BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1898 AS AMENDED IN-
CLUDING THE CHANDLER AcT OF 1938 (1939) 58; Mulder, Ambiguities in the Chandler
Act (1940) 89 U. oF PA. L. REv. 8o, 23; McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to
Amend the Bankruptcy Act (1937) 4 U. OF Ci. L. REv. 369, 393.
13. While the consent of the creditors probably prevents these liens from being
secret liens, this fact will not cure the failure of the prior assignee to give the requisite
notice under state law.
14. Instant case at 4243. See also SAULNIER AND JACOBY, AccoUNTs RECEIVABLE
FINANCING (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1943) 3, 17, 32, 58 et seq.
i5. Adams v. City Bank and. Trust Co., 15 F. (2d) 453 (C. C. A. 5th, i94o),
cert. denied, 312 U.S. 699 (940).
I6. Mr. Justice Jackson in the instant case at 4243 says: "Such a construction [the
instant decision] is capable of harsh results, . . .but we find nothing in Congressional
policy which warrants taking this case out of the letter of the Act." Plainly the ques-
tion before the court was the construction of the language of Section 6o (a) as amended
by the Chandler Act, not the wisdom of the policy there adopted. See THE AmERiCAN
BANxER, April 3, 1943, pages i, 2 and 7, for a criticism of the instant case for destroy-
ing the effectiveness of a sound and prevalent policy.
17. Note 82 supra.
i8. 3 CoLLIm, BANKRUPTCY (i4th ed. i94I) § 6o.oi and note I.
I. 38 STAT. II85 (915), 46 U. S. C. A. § 688 (1928).
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ment for defendant was given on plaintiff's failure to sustain burden of
proof, under Pennsylvania law, of fraudulently obtained written release.
Held, reversed, burden of proof as to releases under the Jones Act is a
substantive rather than a procedural matter, and the law of the forum does
not apply. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 317 U. S. 239 (i943).
As a general rule matters of procedure are determined by the lex fori
and the matters of substance by the lex loci delicti.2  Usually, burden of
proof is considered procedural, but an application of dictionary-like defini-
tions to determine whether it is a matter of substance or procedure is of
little practical value." Various rationales have been adopted where this
"procedural" element has significant effect on substantive rights. In some
cases a functional approach has been used and classification based upon the
purpose for which the particular element involved is to be used.4 Some
courts have held that when a state court is enforcing federal statutory rights,
it should not determine whether the element is substantive or procedural,
but merely employ the federal rules on the matter.0 Others have balanced
the convenience of applying the state court's procedure against the risk of
distorting the result intended by the federal statute.6 The latter is more
favorable to the state's position. Under any of these, however, burden of
proof in the instant case should be held substantive. The intent announced
through the Jones Act is clear. Both Congress 7 and the federal courts 8
2. REsTATEMENT, CoNFLICr OF LAWS ('934) § 585; see also, ibid., Introductory
Note, Chapter 12.
3. In Sampson v. Channel, iio F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. Ist, 1940) burden of proof
was viewed as falling within a "twilight zone" whereby rational classification could
be made either way; see i CHAMBERLAYNE, THE MoDEN LAW OF EVIDENCE (i9ii)
§ i7i, "The distinction between substantive and procedural law is artificial and illusory.
In essence, there is none. The remedy and the predetermined machinery, so far as the
litigant has a recognized claim to use it, are, legally speaking, part of the right itself."
Justice Holmes stated in THE COMMON LAW (1881) 253, "Whenever we trace a lead-
ing doctrine of substantive law far enough back, we are likely to find some forgotten
circumstance of procedure at its source." See GooDmIcH, CONFLiCT OF LAWS (2d ed.
I938) 197.
4. International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U. S. 50, 52 (1926) ; see Note
(1923) 33 YALE L. J. 308, 311, footnote 20, illustrating this functional approach: "The
accuracy of every definition is to be tested only by the purpose for which it is made.
Any classification which is helpful in solving a particular purpose is, to that etent,
correct; difficulty is encountered only when we characterize a definition made for a
particular purpose as true in some universal sense and insist that the same meaning be
used for all other purposes."
5. "The law of the United States cannot be evaded by the forms of local practice."
Holmes, J., in American Railway Express Co. v. Levee, 263 U. S. 19, 21 (1923) ; see
Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U. S. 44 (ig4i); Note (1923) 33 YALE
L. J. 308, 315.
6. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) Introductory Note, Chapter i2; Cook,
Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 333; Tunks,
Categorization and Federalism: "Substance" and "Procedure" after Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins (939) 34 IL.. L. Ray. 271, 276.
7. The first Congress, on July 20, 1790, passed a protective act for seamen in the
merchant marine service, I STAT. 131. General Congressional policy is further shown
in the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 STAT. 1434 (1927),
33 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1943) §§ 915, 916, in which all releases not under the express
terms of the Act are declared invalid.
8. The great solicitude of the courts for seamen's contracts is illustrated by the
words of Justice Story, "They [seamen] are emphatically the wards of the admiralty;
and though not technically incapable of entering into a valid contract, they are treated
in the same manner, as courts of equity are accustomed to treat young heirs, dealing
with their expectancies, wards with their guardians, and cestuis que trust with their
trustees." Harden v. Gordon, ii Fed. Cas. No. 6,o47, at 485; see Harmon v. United
- States, 59 F. (2d) 372, 373 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932) ; The Arizona, 298 U. S. io, 123
(1936).
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have traditionally safeguarded seamen's rights; and as the assignment of
burden of proof concerning the validity of releases is likely to vitally affect
the result of litigation, it is evident that the federal courts properly consider
this element one of substance.9 Decisions of state and federal courts in
administering the Second Federal Employer's Liability Act,10 upon which
the Jones Act is based," invariably have held burden of proof substance,
further indicating that in interpreting a statute of this kind the courts will
consider many "procedural" elements matters of substance. Finally the
desire for uniformity of application of the Jones Act favors the federal
classification of burden of proof as substance in regard to releases. 12 Thus
the decision in the instant case follows the general tendency to protect per-
sonal rights secured by a federal statute.
Criminal Law-Interstate Rendition-Section 6 of Uniform
Extradition Act Constitutional-Relator was arrested on warrant
issued by direction of the Governor of Ohio on request of the Governor of
New York for his extradition to New York, where he had been indicted as
an accomplice in the crime of abortion. Relator had not been in New York
when the crime was committed, and had not fled from New York before or
after the event to avoid trial. Petition for habeas corpus dismissed. Held,
affirmed. Section 6' of the Uniform Extradition Act is constitutional; and
its enactment is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. Cidbertson
v. Sweeney, Court of Appeals of Ohio, 44 N. E. (2d) 807 (Cuyahoga Cty.
1942).
The decisions are in accord that to meet the requirements for extra-
dition under the constitutional provision 2 and congressional statute,8 physi-
cal presence of the accused within the demanding state at the time of the
9. If there is no evidence on the issue, assigning the burden to the plaintiff would
result in entitling the defendant to a directed verdict. Hemingway v. Ill. Central R.
Co., 1"4 Fed. 843, 846 (C. C. A. 5th, igos). If there is some evidence on the issue
and the only defense is contributory negligence, if the burden is on the defendant, the
plaintiff may be entitled to a directed verdict, although had the burden been on him
the same evidence would have been inadequate to assure his victory. Chicago, G. W.
Ry. Co. v. Price, 97 Fed. 423 (C. C. A. 8th, 1899).
io. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hall, 223 Ala. 338, 135 So. 466 (I93I), cert. denied,
284 U. S. 661 (1931) (contributory negligence) ; Central Vermont Ry. Co. v. White,
238 U. S. 507 (1915) (contributory negligence); Crugley v. Grand Trunk Ry., 79
N. H. 276, io8 Atl. 293 (i919) (assumption of risk); New Orleans & N. E. R. R. v.
Harris, 247 U. S. 367 (i918) (original negligence). Although most of these cases
involved burden of proof of negligence in some form, the reasoning seems equally ap-
plicable to other situations involving burden of proof as well.
Ii. Instant case at 244.
12. Panama R. R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 392 (1923), "The statute extends
territorially as far as Congress can make it go, and there is nothing in it to cause its
operation to be otherwise than uniform. The national legislation respecting injuries
to railroad employees engaged in interstate and foreign commerce which it adopts has
a uniform operation, and neither is nor can be deflected therefrom by local statutes or
local views of common-law rules."
i. "The governor of this state may also surrender, on demand of the executive au-
thority of any other state, any person in this state charged in such other state.. . with
committing an act in this state, or in a third state, intentionally resulting in a crime in
the state whose executive authority is making the demand, and the provisions of this
act ...shall apply to such cases, even though the accused was not in that state at the
time of the commission of the crime, and has not fled therefrom." Omfxo GEN. CODE,
§ iog-6.
2. U. S. CoNsr. Art. IV, § 2. "A person ...who shall flee from Justice and be
found in another State. . ."
3. I STAT. 302 (793), i8 U. S. C. A. § 662 (1942).
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alleged crime and flight to the asylum state are essential. 4 Section 6 of the
Uniform Act poses the question whether the federal provisions are exclu-
sive and permit extradition only when the accused is actually a fugitive as
defined by the courts 5 or are limited to the express terms of the grant,"
thereby leaving the states competent to control all phases of extradition not
relating to the handling of fugitives.7 The latter view gains support when
one looks at former state action, aiding and supplementing the federal stat-
ute, which for many years has been upheld by the courts. For example, the
Constitution does not provide that states arrest fugitives from justice prior
to requisition, but statutes authorizing such action have been held consti-
utional.8 Further, a person illegally transported from one state to another
for prosecution cannot in the federal courts compel his return to the asylum
state.9 There is, then, no constitutional right of asylum; and it is not un-
constitutional to surrender a criminal by procedure other than that expressly
set forth by the federal provisions. This coupled with the fact that no one
can be extradited under the federal laws unless he is a fugitive 10 suggests
that cases not involving flight are outside federal control. 1 Certainly there
is no inconsistency between one law providing for fugitives and another for
non-fugitives. The great development in means of communication have
given rise to new criminal methods, and today the federal provisions are
insufficient to combat them. Thus, section 6 closes a loophole in the extra-
dition process, and the instant decision supports good public policy.
2
4. Hyatt v. Corkran, I88 U. S. 69i (1903) ; State v. Parrish, 242 Ala. 7, 5 S. (2d)
828 (94) ; Ex parte Ellis, 223 Mo. App. 125, 9 S. W. (2d) 544 (1928).
5. Hyatt v. Corkran, I88 U. S. 691 (Igo3) ; Ex parte Roberts, I86 Wash. 13, 56
P. (2d) 703 (936) ; see Prigg v. Commonwealth, 41 U. S. 539, 617, 618 (1842). For
support of this view as a basis for the unconstitutionality of the Uniform Act, see
Green, Duties of the Asylum State Under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act
(1939) 30 J. C~ani. L. 295, 319 ff.
6. State v. Wellman, 1O2 Kan. 503, 170 Pac. 1052 (igi); Cockburn v. Willman,
301 Mo. 575, 257 S. W. 458 (1923) ; see Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U. S. 540, 597 (1840) ;
Dennison v. Christian, 72 Neb. 703, 707, IOI N. W. 1045, lo46 (I9O4), aff'd sub nom.,
Dennison v. Christian, ig6 U. S. 637 (9o5) ; State v. Hall, 115 N. C. 81, 818, 20
S. E. 729, 731 (1894).
7. This power arises under Amendment X of the U. S. Constitution, which re-
serves to the states all soverign power not granted to the federal government. (19o8)
21 HARv. L. REv. 224. (To remove undesirable persons from its territory is an in-
herent power of every sovereignty. Before the Constitution, or in the absence of any
statute, each state could surrender criminals or refuse surrender at its discretion. It
does not follow that because the Constitution requires it to surrender them in some
cases, it has lost its discretion in the rest. Otherwise, the ioth amendment would be
of no effect.)
8. Kurtz v. State, 22 Fla. 36, I Am. St. Rep. 173 (1886) ; Commonwealth v. Tracy,
46 Mass. 536 (1843) ; Ex parte Ammons, 34 Ohio 518 (878).
9. Irmes v. Tobin, 240 U. S. 127 (1916) ; Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U. S. 192
(19o6) ; Kelly v. Mangum, 145 Ga. 57, 88 S. E. 556 (ii6).
1o. See note 4 supra.
ii. It follows that a statute, such as the Uniform Act, in the asylum state would
make the transfer of the accused neither illegal nor unconstitutional. For additional
arguments upholding this Section see Report of the Uniform Commissioners as set
forth in Green, Duties of the Asylum State Under the Uniform Criminal Extradition
Act (1939) 30 J. CRm. L. 295, 315; arguments contra, id. at 319 ff. (19o8) 21 HARv.
L. REv. 224 (until amendment providing for rendition of criminals not present in the
demanding state at the time of the crime, federal legislation on the matter Would be
unconstitutional as Congress has power only in cases of fleeing criminals. State action
is the only source of relief) ; HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS (1930) 134; id. (1932) at 399, 400. (The statute
embraces a field entirely outside the province of the federal constitution. .... )
12. Section 6 was included because it is well recognized that leaders of criminal
gangs send henchmen into a state to do an unlawful act, and purposely remain outside
its jurisdiction. Also, it reaches persons engaged in unlawful conspiracies and obtain-
ing money by false pretenses.
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Eminent Domain-Damages-Time of Valuation-In August,
1937 Congress authorized the Central Valley Reclamation Project in Cali-
fornia. The project necessitated relocation of railroad tracks, and on De-
cember 14, 1938, a complaint in eminent domain was filed in the federal
district court. Valuation was fixed as of December, 1938 less any apprecia-
tion since August, 1937. Reversed by Circuit Court of Appeals. Held, judg-
ment of circuit court reversed and that of district court affirmed. De-
fendants are entitled to no increase occurring after the Congressional
authorization, since there was a possibility the land might be condemned
as part of the project. United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369 (1943).
The general rule is that the time of valuation shall be the time of the
"taking" of the property.' However, the whole course of the condemna-
tion process from beginning to end is really a taking; and various steps in
the procedure have been singled out as the proper time for valuation.2 Some
of those selected have been the time of entry on the property, the date of
filing the petition or of commencing the condemnation proceedings,' the
time of the commissioners' award,5 and the time of the trial. Of these
the most common time selected is the date when the condemnation petition
is filed.7 The theory behind this latter rule is that the filing constitutes an
official declaration that the property is desired for public use, and that it
affords a convenient, definite, and invariable point of time in every case to
which the question of compensation may later be referred.8 When there
has been a legislative act describing particular lands and declaring them
taken, or a legislative authorization of a project which will definitely neces-
sitate the acquisition of certain specific pieces of property, it has been held,
that the date of such legislative action should be the time of valuation 9
'rather than the time when condemnation papers are filed. This exception
from the rule can be justified on the grounds that the government should
not have to pay for any enhancement in value arising from the known fact
that the land will be condemned. In the instant case the Supreme Court,
relying on a previous decision,'0 applied the same exception where there
i. Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246 (1934); 2 LEwIs, EBUNEmNT DoMAIN
(3d ed. io9) § 705.
2. 2 NICHOLs, EMINENT DouAris (2d ed. 1917) § 436; 2 LEWIS, EMINENT Do-
MAIN (3d ed. igog) § 705; McCormick, The Measure of Compensation in Eminent
Domain (I933) i7 MINN. L. REv. 461, 496.
3. North Carolina State Highway Commission v. Young, 2oo N. C. 603, 158 S. E.
91 (93) ; Board of Commissioners v. Richardson, 122 S. C. 58, 114 S. E. 632 (i922);
cf. Howell v. State Highway Dept., i67 S. C. 217, i66 S. E. 129 (1932).
4. Ralph v. Hazen, 93 F. (2d) 68 (App. D. C. 1927) ; Smith v. Jeffcoat, 196 Ala.
96, 7i So. 717 (1916) ; Sanitary District of Chicago v. Chapin, 226 Ill. 499, 8o N. E.
1017 (igo7); Acquackanonk Water Co. v. Weidmann Silk.Dyeing Co., 98 N. J. L.
413, 119 Atl. 782 (1923) ; Stahl v. Buffalo, R. & P. Ry. Co., 262 Pa. 493, io6 Adt. 65
(1919).
5. City of Chicago v. Farwell, 286 IU. 415, 121 N. E. 795 (i918).
6. Mulford v. Farmers' Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 62 Colo. 167, x61 Pac. 301
(1916) ; St. Louis, 0. H. & C. Ry. Co. v. Fowler, 142 Mo. 670, 44 S. W. 771 (898).
7. It should be kept in mind, though, that there is little uniformity of opinion, even
within the same state, let alone in different states; decisions vary widely due to dif-
ferent statutes and different circumstances. In general the courts try to weigh the
equities of each particular case in determining the time of valuation.
8. 2 LEwis, EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. i9o9) § 705.
9. Stuhr v. City of Grand Island, 124 Neb. 285, 246 N. W. 461 (933); cf. Kerr
v. South Park Commissioners, 117 U. S. 379, 387 (i886) ; Bourland v. City of Jack-
son, 196 S. W. 1045 (917). Compare In re Department of Public Parks, 53 Hun.
28o, 6 N. Y. S. 750 (1889) with In re New York, 14o App. Div. 238, 125 N. Y. S. 2io
(1910).
io. Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U. S. 282 (I893).
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was a possibility the land would be acquired although no assurance of it."
When there is no certainty that a given piece of property will be condemned
some courts have refused to accept the date of legislative action as the
date for valuation. 2 They reason that the property owner is entitled to
any increment in value up to the time when it is definitely known that his
land will be taken,1 and that a departure from the more general rule of
valuation when condemnation papers are filed is unjustified under such
circumstances.' 4 These latter decisions seem to apply the more equitable
rule.
Trusts-Power of Settlor-Sole Beneficiary to Terminate-Peti-
tioner created a sole and separate use and a spendthrift trust for herself I
for life and remainder to son. Son having full legal capacity, conveyed his
interest to petitioner. Held, petition for termination granted. There was
no valid reason for the continuation of the trust. Bowers' Trust Estate,
346 Pa. 85 (1943).
ii. At the time of the authorization, August 26, 1937, two routes were under con-
sideration for the railroad relocation. One of these routes required the use of defend-
ants' lands, but no decision had as yet been reached regarding which route would be
followed.
12. Maher v. Commonwealth, 291 Mass. 343, 197 N. E. 78 (1935). Massachusetts
seems to have adopted the principle that valuation shall be estimated as of the time that
title is conveyed, regardless of when there was statutory authorization of the project.
Rowan v. Commonwealth, 261 Pa. 88, 104 At. 502 (1918). In this case Pennsylvania
condemned land for a public park at Valley Forge and claimed valuation should be as
of the date of the enabling statute. The statute provided for the acquisition of grounds,
"including Forts Washington and Huntington, and the entrenchments thereto, and the
adjoining grounds, in all not exceeding two hundred and fifty acres." In holding that
the time of the statute should not be used in valuation, but that the time of appropria-
tion should govern, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said no specific area except
the forts and entrenchments were named in the act and reasoned that, "Until after the
commissioners had fixed the exact location and boundaries, owners of land not covered
by these designated objects were without means of determining whether or not their
property would be within the area required by the state." Id. at 95, 504.
13. Rowan v. Commonwealth, 261 Pa. 88, lo4 Atl. 502 (I918), cited supra note 12;
In re Condemnation of Certain Land for New Statehouse, 19 R. I. 382, 33 At. 523
(1896). The Rhode Island Court held that since hearings of public necessity were
necessary after filing the condemnation certificate, even the latter time should not be
considered as the date for valuation, that the valuation time was the time when it be-
came certain the land would be taken.
14. The position which Louisiana has adopted is probably the farthest, at least in
statutory terms, that any state has gone in selecting an early point in the taking process
for purposes of valuation. In that state legislation was passed fixing the time the con-
templated improvement was "proposed" as the date for valuation. LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
(Dart, 1932) Art. 2633. However, the Louisiana courts have held a project is not
"proposed" until there are some rather definite appropriating acts. Thus the Louisiana
Supreme Court said in Opelousas G. & N. E. Ry. Co. v. St. Landry Cotton Oil Co., 1I8
La. 290, 42 So. 940 (1907), that "the value has to be computed as of the day when, the
line of the railroad having been definitely located, and the need for the land having
actually arisen, the expropriating company demands to have it and offers to make
payment."
i. The deed of trust stated payments to be made to the settlor "for her sole and
separate use, she being now in contemplation of marriage with George A. Beech, so
that the same shall not be subject or liable to the debts, contracts or engagements of
the said George A. Beech, nor of her own, and so that the same shall not be taken in
execution, or attachment, or sequestration, or be subject to any conveyance, assignment
or anticipation whatsoever; it being the intent of the donor herein to preserve the prin-
cipal or corpus of the said trust estate for the benefit of her son. . ..
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The decision in the instant case is in accord with both the majority
view 2 and the Restatement of Trusts s in permitting termination of a trust
by the settlor and the beneficiaries. Here, however, settlor and beneficiary
were one person, and prior Pennsylvania decisions did not unreservedly
adopt the general view in this situation.4 The former Pennsylvania view
resulted in part from a failure to distinguish between a testamentary or an
inter vivos trust the settlor of which is dead, and an inter vivos trust, the
settlor of which is living and joins with the beneficiaries in requesting
termination. 5 Another reason was the insistence of Pennsylvania courts
that a spendthrift trust created for oneself shall not be terminable,6
the rationale being that a settlor who has provided against his own weak-
ness, should not be permitted to undo such provision in a moment of folly.7
The fallacy of this approach is obvious.8 Therefore, by the instant decision
the court has reversed the prior Pennsylvania law; and this places the juris-
2. Roberts, J., "The general rule is that all parties in interest may terminate the
trust." Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 U. S. 93, 97 (935) ; Botzum v. Havana National
Bank, 367 IIl. 539, 12 N. E. (2d) 203 (1937) ; Fredricks v. Near, 26o Mich. 627, 245
N. W. 537 (932); Fowler v. Lanpher, 193 Wash. 308, 75 P. (2d) 132 (1938) ; 3
SCOTT, TRUSTS (i939) § 338. This rule is not applicable if at the time of the attempted
revocation any party in interest was under a disability. Twinings Appeal, 97 Pa. 36
(188).
3. "If the settlor and all of the beneficiaries of a trust consent and none of them
is under an incapacity, they can compel the termination or modification of the trust,
although the purposes of the trust have not been accomplished." RESTATEMENT,
TRUSTS (1935) § 338 (1).
4. "If the settlor is the sole beneficiary of a. trust and is not under an incapacity,-
he can compel the termination of the trust, although the purposes of the trust have not
been accomplished." RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (935) § 339. This, however, is qualified
in its application by the Pennsylvania courts and the Pennsylvania rule had been stated
as follows: "If the settlor is the sole beneficiary of a trust and is not under an in-
capacity, he can compel the termination of the trust provided it was neither made to
protect him from his own habits nor is a spendthrift trust." RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS,
PA. ANNOT. (1939) § 339.
The only jurisdiction that seemed to be in accord with Pennsylvania was Kentucky.
The courts of the latter state qualified the rule by refusing revocation where the trust
was to save the settlor-beneficiary from folly or special incapacity. Downs v. Security
Trust Company, 175 Ky. 789, 194 S. W. 1041 (1917) (settlor was a drunkard) ; Fidel-
ity & Columbia Trust Co. v. Gwynn, 2o6 Ky. 823, 268 S. W. 537, 38 A. L. R. 937
(1925) (settlor was an epileptic).
5. Generally courts have taken the attitude that they should see that property be
disposed of according to the wishes of the settlor. Therefore, failure to distinguish
between these two situations would restrict living settlors who consent to termination
of the trust from effecting such a termination. There does not seem to be any valid
reason why a trust should not be revocable if all parties in interest consent. Naturally
the death of the settlor precludes such consent and in this situation the trust should not
be terminable.
In England consent of all beneficially interested has been held sufficient, even
though the settlor does not join them in the request. 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS (0939) § 338.
6. A spendthrift trust created for the benefit of the settlor is not in itself invalid,
but one cannot create such a trust effective against the rights of subsequent creditors
of the settlor. GmswoLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS (936) § 474.
7. Rehr v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 310 Pa. 30, i65 Atl. 38o, 91 A. L. R.
99 (1933), (1933) 43 YALE L. J. 342. For further history of this litigation see Rehr
v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 37 D. & C. 324 (Pa. I94O), (940) 39 MICH. L.
REv. 174.
8. For adverse criticism see (933) YALE L. J. 342; Note (1937) 46 YALE L. J.
1005, 1015; (1940) 39 MICH. L. REv. 174. The fact that the trust may be the product
of folly and the attempted termination the product of wisdom, does not seem to have
occurred to the earlier Pennsylvania courts. Furthermore, the trust does not offer the
settlor-beneficiary any protection (supra note 6) and his efforts in no manner con-
serve his estate. 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS (939) § 339; GRIswOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS
(936) §498.
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diction in accord with the majority view.9 In some states the question of
termination of a trust has been removed from the courts by legislative
enactment, 10 but such statutes are comparatively few in number." In view
of so acceptable and so desirable a rule it would seem that statutory pro-
visions were unnecessary since the courts have adequately dealt with the
matter.
9. Undoubtedly the court was motivated in part by the particular economic con-
siderations involved since it specifically mentions that the "income has been reduced
from about $i,8o to less than $400 per annum." But the language of the court is un-
mistakable and we are compelled to conclude that the court is changing the existing
decisional law of the state.
io. N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY, § 23 states: "Upon the written consent of all the
persons beneficially interested in a trust . . . the creator of such trust may revoke
. . . and thereupon the estate of the trustee shall cease. . . ." A substantially similar
provision is to be found in § II8 of the N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW. For other stat-
utory provisions see CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 228o, and N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1935) § 996.
i. Note (937) 46 YALE L. J. 1005, ioi8.
